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Abstract
In this paper we seriously entertain the question, “Is 
maternal deprivation the root of all evil?” Our con-
sideration of this question is broken down into three 
parts. In the fi rst part, we discuss the nature of evil, 
focusing in particular on the legal concept of 
depravity. In the second part, we discuss the nurture 
of evil, focusing in particular on the common deve-
lopmental trajectory seen in those who are depraved. 
In the third part, we discuss the roots of evil, focu-
sing in particular on the animal and human research 
regarding maternal deprivation. Our conclusion is 
that maternal deprivation may actually be the root of 
all evil, but only because depraved individuals have 
been deprived of normative maternal care, which is 
the cradle of our humanity.
Key words: maternal deprivation, evil, depravi-
ty, development, parenting.
Resumen
En este artículo se aborda seriamente la pregunta 
¿es la privación materna la raíz de toda la maldad? 
La consideración sobre esta cuestión se divide en 
tres partes. En la primera se discute la naturaleza 
de la maldad, enfocándose en particular sobre el 
concepto de depravación. En la segunda se aborda 
la crianza de la maldad, con base en la trayectoria 
evolutiva común vista en aquellos que son depra-
vados. En la tercera se explora la raíz de la mal-
dad, a partir de la investigación animal y humana 
sobre la privación materna. La conclusión es que 
la privación materna puede ser realmente la raíz de 
todos los males, pero sólo cuando los individuos 
depravados han sido privados del cuidado maternal 
normativo, el cual es la cuna de la humanidad.
Palabras clave: privación materna, maldad, de-
pravación, desarrollo, crianza de los hijos.
In this article we seriously consider the proposition 
that maternal deprivation is the root of all kinds of 
evil. This proposition is an obvious paraphrase of 
Paul’s well-known, but often misquoted, admoni-
tion to Timothy: “For the love of money is the root 
of all kinds of evil” (Timothy 6:10). We will argue 
that as a practical matter, there may have been much 
truth in Paul’s advice to Timothy about the perils 
of money, but as a scientifi c matter, Paul may have 
been wide off the mark. In contrast, the Ten Com-
mandments serve as an uncannily accurate preview 
of the arguments we will be making in this paper 
(Exodus 20:1-17, paraphrased):
You shall have no other gods before me.
You shall not worship false idols.
You shall not misuse the name of the Lord.
Remember the Sabbath day by keeping it holy.
Honor your father and mother, so that you may live 
long in the land.
You shall not murder.
You shall not commit adultery.
You shall not steal.
You shall not lie.
You shall not covet your neighbors’ possessions, or 
his people.
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We will have several opportunities to refer back 
to the Ten Commandments as we progress through 
our arguments. For now, we would like to highlight 
several features of this early guide to moral con-
duct. First, the fi rst four commandments prescribe 
appropriate modes of worship, and refl ect major 
concerns of the fl edgling church. Second, the fi f-
th commandment tells us to honor our parents, as 
we honor God—thus the fi rst fi ve commandments 
dictate that we are servants to a higher good (this 
reminds us of Gale Sayers’, 2001, immortal saying, 
“The Lord is fi rst, my friends are second, and I am 
third.”). Third, the remaining fi ve commandments 
(which perhaps may be seen as following, develo-
pmentally, from the fi rst fi ve) are prescriptions for 
moral, humane behavior. The fi nal point regarding 
the Ten Commandments is that of the last fi ve com-
mandments, the fi rst four are behavioral, whereas 
the last is cognitive—it is not enough to act well, 
one should also think well. 
Returning to the central proposition of this 
article, you will notice that it contains three core 
concepts: maternal deprivation, root, and evil. We 
will address these one at a time, in reverse order. In 
this way we will investigate the truth value of this 
proposition, based on the best scientifi c evidence 
available.
Depraved behavior: The nature of evil
Evil is a complex and multifaceted concept. The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Lan-
guage offers the following defi nition of evil:
adj. 
1. Morally bad or wrong; wicked: an evil tyrant. 
2. Causing ruin, injury, or pain; harmful: the evil 
effects of a poor diet. 
3. Characterized by or indicating future misfortu-
ne; ominous: evil omens. 
4. Bad or blameworthy by report; infamous: an 
evil reputation. 
5. Characterized by anger or spite; malicious: an 
evil temper. 
noun. 
1. The quality of being morally bad or wrong; 
wickedness. 
2. That which causes harm, misfortune, or des-
truction: a leader’s power to do both good and 
evil. 
3. An evil force, power, or personifi cation. 
4. Something that is a cause or source of suffering, 
injury, or destruction: the social evils of poverty 
and injustice. 
As this defi nition makes clear, “evil” can re-
fer to evil acts (e.g., breaches of the Ten Com-
mandments), evil persons (those whom break the 
commandments), evil characteristics of persons 
(violent or covetous), supernatural forces that are 
evil (Satan), or natural forces that are evil (money). 
Like common psychological constructs such as 
“learning,” “intelligence,” and “creativity,” evil is 
clearly a complex and challenging concept. Fur-
ther, evil is a concept that is not often discussed in 
scientifi c circles. A PsychINFO search yielded just 
279 hits for evil (in the title), as compared to 7269 
hits for “aggression” and 8380 hits for “violence.” 
Andrew Delbanco (1995) in his book The death of 
Satan argues that the concept of evil is dying out 
in America and that perhaps, as a consequence, we 
have become more tolerant of evil in our midst. 
He further argues that evil is increasingly visible 
(e.g., on the evening news and in the theater), is 
increasingly prevalent (e.g., mass murders, crimes 
of humanity), and yet we have lost a vocabulary for 
talking about it. Due to the disinterest of science 
and the secularization of religious institutions, our 
explanations for evil—both scientifi c and popu-
lar—may never have been weaker.
Nevertheless evil is a concept that may have so-
me value, even in scientifi c discourse, for it seems 
to encode a level of depravity that is missing in 
such terms as violence and aggression. Although 
evil may be diffi cult to defi ne, it appears to be so-
mething that we know when we see it:
To know evil, you have only to stand on the road in 
Jasper, Texas, where on June 7, 1998, three white men 
offered a ride to a 49-year-old black man, James Byrd 
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Jr., who was on his way home from an anniversary par-
ty. Instead of taking him where he wanted to go, they 
beat, kicked, and tortured him merely for the color of 
his skin, and then spray-painted his face black before 
chaining him by the ankles to the back of their truck. 
As they sped down an isolated logging road, dragging 
him for nearly three miles, he tried keeping his head 
up, but his skin ripped off, his bones broke, and his 
elbows were shattered to the bone. When his head hit 
a culvert, it was ripped off, along with his right arm. 
What was left of his torso was dumped in front of a 
church for its black congregation to fi nd. In TNT’s 
documentary, The faces of evil, Dr. Molefi  Kete Asante 
of Temple University points out multiple circles still 
evident on the road, drawn there to mark 75 separate 
places where Byrd’s body parts were found. ‘On this 
road,’ Asante says quietly, ‘I am confronted with the 
immensity of the cruelty that can exist in the human 
heart’ (Ramsland, 2003, p. 1). 
If we agree to call acts such as the torture, muti-
lation, and murder of James Byrd as evil, then evil 
would seem to come in several varieties, including 
the following. First, there is the hate crime, where 
one or more individuals brutally attack someone 
on the basis of religious or ethnic background 
(e.g., the murders of James Byrd in Jasper, Texas, 
and of Matthew Shepard in Laramie, Wyoming). 
Second, there is genocide, or crimes against hu-
manity, where an organized group of individuals 
attacks another group, usually on the basis of reli-
gious or ethnic background (e.g., Osama bin Laden 
and El Qaeda, or Hitler and the Nazis). Third, there 
is mass murder, where one or more individuals 
attack a group, more or less at random (e.g., Charles 
Whitman at the University of Texas, or the Colum-
bine shootings). Fourth, there is the serial killer, 
who commits a series of murders, usually in a grue-
some manner (e.g., Jack the Ripper, Ted Bundy). 
Fifth, there is the parent who kills (e.g., Andrea Ya-
tes of Houston, or Susan Smith of South Carolina). 
And sixth, there are children who kill, often in pairs 
or small groups. Consider the following account of 
a child murderer, one of several written about by Dr. 
Katherine Ramsland in her excellent online article, 
Children who kill (Ramsland, 2003, p. 5): 
May 21, 1998—Kipland Kinkel, 15, had just been ex-
pelled from school in Springfi eld, Oregon, for carrying 
a gun to class. He returned with a semiautomatic rifl e 
and went into the cafeteria, where he started shooting. 
He killed one student and wounded eight others, one 
of whom later died, and he also caused a stampede that 
resulted in more injuries. He was disarmed and taken 
to the police station, where he withdrew a hidden kni-
fe. He claimed he wanted to die. Police offi cers who 
went to his home discovered that he’d killed both of 
his parents and had booby-trapped the house with 
fi ve homemade bombs—one of which he’d placed 
underneath his mother’s corpse. His classmates had 
once dubbed him the student ‘most likely to start 
World War III.’
What do the hate crimes, crimes against hu-
manity, mass murders, serial killings, murders of 
children by parents, and murders by children, all 
have in common? They are pre-meditated acts of 
violence. These are not crimes of passion, or of ins-
trumental aggression. These are acts of cold bloo-
ded murder, often accompanied by wanton cruelty. 
In other words, these are acts of evil. But what 
separates these evil deeds from other capital offen-
ses, such as murder or manslaughter? According to 
the legal system, it is the depravity of the crime. If 
murder is premeditated, is accompanied by torture 
or maiming, is senseless or wanton, then it is con-
sidered depraved by the legal system, and warrants 
stiffer penalties, including the death penalty.
Michael Welner is a forensic psychiatrist who 
has begun a systematic study of depravity, arguing 
that depravity is an important factor in the convic-
tion and sentencing of criminals, but is fuzzily de-
fi ned and unsystematically applied in U.S. courts. 
He has developed The depravity scale (Welner, 
1998; see also www.depravityscale.org) as a way of 
standardizing and clarifying the construct of depra-
vity. Welner essentially takes a behavioral approach 
to defi ning and measuring depravity, arguing that 
we should look at what the killer actually says and 
does, before, during, and after the crime, rather 
than placing our faith solely on hard evidence and 
traditional psychological examinations. Welner’s 
depravity scale has three subscales—intent, action, 
and attritudes: 
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The evidence establishing depraved intent includes 
the following behaviors:
1. Intent to emotionally traumatize the victim (e.g., 
an intruder who attempts to destroy objects of 
greatest personal meaning).
2. Intent to maximize damage (e.g., a terrorist who 
says “We fi gured the best time to put the nerve 
gas on the train was during rush hour.”).
3. Intent to permanently disfi gure (e.g., a stalker 
whose attacks focus on the face or sexual or-
gans, as with a caustic substance).
4. Infl uencing depravity in others to avoid prosecu-
tion or penalty (e.g., hiring a contract killer).
5. Infl uencing depravity in others to overcome 
personal limitations (e.g., teenage girls who kill, 
typically recruit male accomplices to actually 
perform the act).
The evidence establishing depraved actions inclu-
des the following behaviors:
1. Prolonging a victim’s suffering (e.g., “The child 
was found with cigarette burns on her genitalia, 
and cord burns around her wrists.”).
2. Unrelenting physical and emotional harm (e.g., 
“The child was dirty, malnourished, and found 
with numerous fractures, both new and old.”).
3. egree of physical harm (e.g., “The victim was 
beaten so badly he could not be recognized, and 
lay in intensive care for eight weeks.”).
4. Quality of the victim’s suffering (e.g., “The 
victim was left in the desert, begging for his 
life.”).
The evidence establishing depraved attitudes in-
cludes the following:
1. Perpetrator shows response of indifference, sa-
tisfaction, or satiety to depravity (e.g., defendant 
brags about the offense: “Sometimes you just 
gotta take out the trash.”).
2. Falsely accusing others of depraved actions, 
deliberately exposing the innocent to penalty 
(e.g., “I didn’t do it, but I will give you the name 
of the person who did.”).
3. Perpetrator projects responsibility for depravity 
onto the victim; perpetrator projects a sense of 
entitlement (e.g., “I didn’t rape her, she wanted 
it,” or “They deserved to die, they were stu-
pid.”).
Welner, who has collected over 4,000 responses 
to his scale, is still in the process of validating The 
depravity scale. But thus far he has found impres-
sive consistency in respondents’ perceptions of 
depravity, and it appears that there is substantial 
agreement within the United States about what 
constitutes a depraved criminal act. In this article 
we argue that depravity is the essential ingredient 
for evil, and that Welner may have taken some of 
the fi rst steps in placing the study of evil on a fi rm 
scientifi c foundation.
Pathways to depravity: The nurture of evil
Violent crime is a big problem in the United Sta-
tes, a statement that should surprise almost no one. 
According to Garbarino (1999), there are approxi-
mately 23,000 homicides committed in the United 
States annually, and of the killers, 10% (2,300) are 
under age 18. Coincidentally, approximately 2,300 
children kill themselves each year in the United 
States. These numbers amount to about two or three 
large high schools being lost to violent crimes by 
youths each year—a staggering number. As bad as 
these numbers are, the actual problem is far worse. 
Garbarino (1999) argues that homicide and suicide 
rates actually underestimate the incidence of vio-
lent crime. There are a number of reasons why this 
is true. One reason is improved care provided by 
trauma units. Garbarino reports that in Chicago, se-
rious (life-threatening) assaults increased by 400% 
from the 1970s to the 1990s, but the homicide rate 
stayed the same—this due to improved treatment 
by trauma services. Further, overall homicide ra-
tes—which are leveling off—are affected by demo-
graphic trends such as the percentage of youth in 
the overall population, which is decreasing. All of 
this is to say there is an epidemic of deadly youth 
violence in the United States, and quite understan-
dably, lots of people want to know why.
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We believe that the best answer to the question 
of why children kill is essentially a developmental 
one. In other words, if we are to understand the 
causes of youth violence, we are going to have 
to look closely at the developmental histories of 
children who commit violent acts. There is nothing 
new about looking to childhood experiences for 
causes of violence (see, for example, Garbarino, 
1999; Karr-Morse & Wiley, 1997; Lavin & Park, 
1999). What is new in this paper is that we provide 
a comprehensive summary of the evidence—more 
comprehensive we believe than any other review to 
date—and also introduce a new perspective on the 
ontogenetic origins of depravity, namely, what is 
known from animal and human research about the 
long-term effects of maternal deprivation.
The essential elements of our summary are 
diagrammed in Figure 1. Figure 1 charts the cas-
cade of developmental events leading from early 
parent-child interactions during infancy to the 
commission of violent crimes during adolescence. 
There is good empirical evidence supporting all 
components of the model, although the evidence is 
stronger in some places than in others. Neverthe-
less, even this model, while impressively compre-
hensive, is incomplete. For example, Figure 1 does 
not include prenatal infl uences (see, for example, 
Karr-Morse & Wiley, 1997), but instead begins 
postnatally. Further, the chart is truncated at the 
other end, and does not include adulthood. There 
are several reasons for these choices, including 
brevity, but the overarching reasons are (a) we wish 
to focus on the nurture of evil, and (b) childhood is 
not only where we fi nd the root causes, but also the 
early manifestations of depraved behavior. 
The fi rst row in Figure 1 identifi es major land-
marks in the nurture of children who become vio-
lent. We have deliberately labeled this row Mi-
crosystem Infl uences (see Bronfenbrenner, 1992, 
1999) to emphasize the systemic nature children’s 
developmental histories. A simplified view of 
Bronfenbrenner’s ecological systems model is 
presented in Figure 2. The core system in this mo-
del is the microsystem, which is a particular social 
context in which the developing child participates. 
Of course, the fi rst and most important microsystem 
is the family, which includes parents, siblings, and 
perhaps extended family members. Microsystems 
Pathways to Depravity
Infancy (0-3) Preschool (3-6) Childhood (6-12) Adolecence (12-18)
Microsystem 
Infl uences
Psychological 
Abandonment
Ineffective Discipline
Poor Parental 
Monitoring Negative 
Peer Infl uence
Behaviorial 
Milestones
Dyan: 
Disturbed Attachment
Home: 
Aggression & 
Noncompliance
School: 
Peer Rejection & 
Academic Failure
Community: 
Criminal Behavior 
(including Assault)
Diagnostic 
Markers
Attachment & Regulatory 
Disorders
Oppositional-Defi ant 
Disorder
Conduct Disroder
Anti-Social 
Personality Disorder
Neurological 
dysfunction
Orbito-Frontal Cortex 
Temporal Lobes (Cortex) 
Hippocampus Amygdala
Figure 1. The developmental pathways to depravity during childhood, highlighted by microsystem infl uences, 
behavioral milestones, diagnostic markers, and neurological dysfunction (Source: authors).
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are characterized by several social-developmental 
features, including settings, roles, and activities. 
As microsystems, families typically exist within 
certain settings (homes), while family members are 
prescribed different roles (parent vs. child), and en-
gage in setting-appropriate activities (e.g., feeding, 
nurturing). Microsystems are the building blocks 
for larger, more complex systems relevant to the 
developing child. The mesosystem is the set of all 
microsystems within which the child participates 
(e.g., home, school, neighborhood peer group). An 
important feature of ecological systems theory is 
that it emphasizes the connections and consisten-
cies among these microsystems of the developing 
child, a feature that is instantiated practically by 
multisystemic therapy (see the multisystemic thera-
py website for a complete list of references: http://
www.mstservices.com/). The exosystem is the set 
of all microsystems which impact the developing 
child directly, but within which the child does not 
participate. Common examples are parents’ wor-
kplaces and settings where parents socialize or 
worship. The importance of the exosystem lies in 
the fact that practices (e.g., child care policies) and 
events (e.g., layoffs) occurring within the child’s 
exosystem can have dramatic effects on the 
child’s developmental trajectory. The macrosys-
tem refers to the set of beliefs, practices, laws, and 
values that characterize the broader culture or so-
ciety within which the child and family develop. 
These macrosystem-level phenomena (determi-
ning, for example, accessibility to quality child 
care) permeate the developing child’s exosystem 
and mesosystem experiences, thereby shaping and 
directing the child’s developmental trajectories. 
The chronosystem (Bronfenbrenner, 1986) is the 
fi nal component of Bronfenbrenner’s model, and 
refers to changes occuring in the ecology of the 
child as he or she develops. Some of these chan-
ges may be driven by forces external to the family 
(e.g., changes in child welfare policy), some may 
be driven by structural or other changes occurring 
within the family (e.g., divorce, death of a parent, 
birth of a sibling), and some are driven by develo-
ping persons within the child’s mesosystem, inclu-
ding the child. For example, when children reach 
the age of two or three, becoming more mobile and 
independent, parents are faced with a new set of 
challenges in terms of discipline. To take another 
example, as children develop they typically branch 
out beyond the home into multiple microsystems 
(i.e., home, school, peer group), in other words, 
their mesosystems expand.
It is a well-documented fact that the parents of 
violent children are notoriously poor at fulfi lling 
the normative roles associated with the microsys-
tem of the home. During infancy, the major factor 
appears to be parental abandonment (Garbarino, 
1999). Although abuse at the hands of parents re-
ceives the most attention, developmental psycho-
logists are coming to believe that neglect is at least 
as harmful (Cicchetti & Carlson, 1989; Cicchetti 
& Toth, 1995; Pollak, Cicchetti, Hornung & Reed, 
2000). Further, the situation in many high-risk 
homes is tantamount to abandonment, where the 
needs of the developing infant are barely met, and 
abuse is mixed with neglect and a general failure 
to fulfi ll the roles and obligations of parenthood. 
Thus, it is often the case that even though parents 
may not physically abandon their offspring, their 
failure to parent is in effect a form of psychological 
abandonment.
As might be expected, maltreated infants are at 
high-risk for disturbances of attachment (Carlson, 
Cicchetti, Barnett & Braunwald, 1989; Egeland 
& Sroufe, 1981). Infants raised in these high-risk 
situations are more likely to develop insecure or 
disorganized attachments, and these disturbances 
of attachment may then become independent risk 
factors contributing to poor developmental trajec-
tories later during the preschool years and child-
hood (Greenberg, 1999; Lyons-Ruth & Jacobvitz, 
1999). The same breakdowns in caretaking that 
disturb the development of attachment are likely 
to disturb other important socio-emotional proces-
ses, such as the young child’s ability to regulate 
affective and sensorimotor responses (Calkins & 
Fox, 2002; Greenspan, 1992; Schore, 1994). These 
physiological and behavioral processes are associa-
ted with what we call the “OTHA Complex”, which 
refers to a set of cortical and limbic structures in-
cluding the orbito-frontal cortex, medial temporal 
lobes, hippocampus, and amygdala (Schore, 1994; 
Siegel, 1999). As we shall see, the OTHA complex 
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is implicated in studies of depraved behavior (e.g., 
violent criminals), as well as in studies of maternal 
deprivation (e.g., institutionally-reared children).
This brief summary of developmental outcomes 
associated with early parental abandonment is con-
tained within the fi rst column of Figure 1 (Infan-
cy). Many of the post-infancy components of the 
Figure 1 have been researched by Gerald Patterson 
and his colleagues at the Oregon Learning Center 
(Patterson, 1986; Patterson, DeBaryshe & Ramsey, 
1989; Reid, Patterson & Snyder, 2002). Patterson 
and his colleagues have systematically developed 
and tested a developmental model of antisocial 
behavior in boys. According to the Oregon model, 
the developing child poses a series of challenges to 
parents, challenges for which some parents are ill 
prepared. The fi rst of these challenges is presented 
by the preschooler, whose normal strivings for 
independence are met with ineffective and harsh 
discipline. This aggressive and poorly socialized 
preschooler is poorly prepared for the transition to 
school, where he faces rejection by normally deve-
loping peers, and academic failure. The challenges 
to parents escalate during childhood, as boys in 
particular become increasingly independent, ag-
gressive, and connected to a deviant peer group. 
Interactional patterns within the family become 
increasingly aversive over time, and these mal-
adaptive patterns themselves are supportive of pa-
thological processes both within individual family 
members and within the family system (Patterson, 
1980; Patterson & Banks, 1989). The net result is a 
pathway that leads from early interactional and pa-
renting failures to adolescents that are aggressive, 
antisocial, and prone to criminal activity (Garbari-
no, 1999; Karr-Morse & Wiley, 1997).
Operating in parallel to these microsystem in-
fl uences and developmental behavioral milestones 
are a series of diagnostic classifi cations that run 
from attachment and regulatory disorders during 
infancy to anti-social personality disorder during 
adolescence and adulthood (Black, 1999; Frick, 
1998; Lahey & Loeber, 1994; Loeber et al, 1992). 
These diagnostic markers are summarized in the 
third row of Figure 1, and represent a developmen-
tal sequence of increasingly serious psychopatholo-
gical conditions. This sequence is characterized by 
the fact that although each diagnostic marker (e.g., 
oppositional defi ant disorder) may be followed by 
the next diagnostic marker in the sequence (e.g., 
conduct disorder), adolescents who are classifi ed 
with the later-onset markers (i.e., antisocial perso-
nality disorder) almost certainly have progressed 
through the early markers in the sequence. Accor-
ding to Frick (1998, pp. 15-16):
“[T]here seems to be a clear hierarchical pattern to 
the behavioral progression. Whereas few boys start 
showing the more severe antisocial and aggressive 
behaviors without fi rst showing the less severe oppo-
sitional behaviors at earlier ages, a large proportion of 
children with less severe oppositional behaviors do not 
progress on to the more serious antisocial behaviors. 
To illustrate this hierarchical pattern, a 4-year longitu-
dinal study of clinic-referred boys (initially aged 6-13) 
found that 82% of the boys who developed a serious 
conduct disorder in the third and fourth years of the 
study had shown less serious oppositional behaviors 
in prior years (Hinshaw et al., 1993; Lahey & Loeber, 
1994). In contrast, only about half (47%) of the boys 
who showed oppositional behaviors in the fi rst year of 
the study progressed on to the more severe antisocial 
and aggressive behaviors over the 4-year course of 
the study.” 
This asymmetry between forward-looking and 
backward-looking probabilities appears to apply 
to the entire sequence shown in Figure 1, going 
all the way from attachment disorder infancy to 
adulthood criminality (Greenberg, 1999; Heckel & 
Shumaker, 2001). We have represented the asym-
metry of these developmental pathways in Figure 3, 
which shows the sequence of diagnostic markers as 
a series of concentric circles (which are not drawn 
to scale). The fi gure is designed to show how, for 
example, only some of the children classifi ed with 
attachment disorder will go on to be classifi ed with 
oppositional defi ant disorder. On the other hand, a 
very high percentage of those children classifi ed 
with oppositional defi ant disorder were earlier cla-
ssifi ed with attachment disorder. Whether or not a 
child remains on the pathway to depraved behavior 
is determined by a constellation of risk and resilien-
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ce factors that characterize the developing child’s 
ecological system (see Figure 2).
Before going on to the next section it is wor-
thwhile summarizing the major diagnostic features 
of the disorders listed in Figures 1 and 3. We will 
skip attachment and regulatory disorders, since 
they will be discussed more fully in the following 
section on maternal deprivation. According to the 
fourth edition of the Diagnostic and statistical 
manual of mental disorders (1994; see also Frick, 
1999), oppositional defiant disorder (ODD) is 
characterized by a recurrent pattern of negativistic, 
defi ant, disobedient, and hostile behavior towards 
authority fi gures. Symptoms of ODD include fre-
quent loss of temper, frequent arguments with 
adults, refusals to comply with adults requests or 
rules, deliberately annoying other people, blaming 
others for his mistakes or behavior, is touchy or 
easily annoyed by others, and is often resentful 
or angry. Conduct disorder (CD) takes this pattern 
of oppositional behavior to next level, and is a di-
sorder of later childhood and adolescence. CD is 
characterized by a repetitive and persistent pattern 
of behavior in which the basic rights of others or 
major age-appropriate societal norms are violated. 
Symptoms of CD include aggression to people or 
animals (e.g., bullying, fi ghting, use of weapons, 
cruelty to people and/or animals, forced sex), des-
truction of property (e.g., fi re setting), deceitfulness 
or theft (e.g., breaking and entering, auto theft, 
stealing personal valuables), and serious violations 
of rules (e.g., staying out at night, running away, 
truancy). Importantly, there are two subtypes of 
CD, and childhood-onset type and an adolescent-
onset type. The childhood-onset type is the one re-
presented by the sequence shown in Figures 1 and 
3 (Black, 1999; Frick, 1999). Finally, antisocial 
personality disorder (APD) is characterized by a 
pervasive pattern of disregard for and violation of 
the rights of others occurring since the age of 15 
years, and is characterized by the following symp-
toms: Repeatedly engaging in acts that are grounds 
for arrest, repeated lying, use of aliases, or conning 
of others, impulsivity and failure to plan ahead, 
Pathways to Depravity
Infancy (0-3) Preschool (3-6) Childhood (6-12) Adolecence (12-18)
MacrosystemMacrosystem
Chronosystem
ExosystemExosystem
Mesosystem
Home 
Mesosystem 
(Settings) 
(Activities) 
(Roles)
Home
School
Peers
Figure 2. An ecological systems model for understanding children’s development in context (Bronfenbrenner, 1992, 
1999) (Source: authors).
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irritability and aggressiveness, leading to repeated 
fi ghts and assaults, reckless disregard for the safety 
of others and oneself, irresponsible work behavior 
(e.g., can’t hold jobs for long), and lack of remorse. 
In order to receive an APD diagnosis, individuals 
must be at least 18, and displayed of CD with onset 
before age 15.
These three diagnostic categories—ODD, CD, 
and APD—not only form a pathological develop-
mental sequence, as has already been discussed, 
but their symptoms read like a systematic breaking 
of the Ten Commandments, one of mankind’s most 
basic set of moral guidelines. Further, one can 
easily see in these symptoms either the outright 
depravity contained in Welner’s (1998) Depra-
vity scale, or at least the seeds of this depravity. 
The point that we have attempted to make in this 
section is that a reasonable argument can be made 
for origins of such depravity (evil) in the develop-
mental histories of those individuals who commit 
depraved actions. The problem with the evidence 
reviewed thus far is that the developmental pathway 
from early abandonment and maltreatment to later 
serious antisocial behavior is multi-determined, 
making it diffi cult to make causal inferences regar-
ding the origins of depravity. However, there is a 
body of literature that is able to separate negative 
early experiences such as abuse and neglect, from 
ongoing risk factors that are present when chil-
dren continue to be raised by the same parents, in 
the same neighborhoods, and with the same peer 
group. The body of literature that we refer to is the 
research on maternal deprivation, which includes 
studies involving both animals and humans (studies 
of postinstitutionalized children raised by adopti-
ve parents). This research points strongly to early 
experiences as having profound and long-term 
consequences for children’s development.
Maternal deprivation: The roots of evil
Children adopted from the foster care system or 
from institutions overseas are likely to have ex-
perienced a wide variety of risk factors (Johnson, 
2000; Rutter, 1981; Yarrow, 1961). Almost by defi -
nition, children who are eligible for adoption have 
Depraved 
Behavior 
(Evil)
Attachment Disorder
Conduct Disorder
Oppositional and Defi ant Disorder
Anti-Social Personality
Risk and Resilence
Figure 3. The prospective and retrospective pathways to and from depravity are asymmetrical: Virtually everyone who 
is classifi ed as anti-social personality (or engages in depraved behavior) has passed through all of the previous steps in 
the sequence; however, many of those who are classifi ed at earlier steps manage to avoid progressing to more serious 
classifi cations. (Source: authors).
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experienced the loss of their biological mother, 
either through death, abandonment, or separation. 
We will use the term maternal deprivation to refer 
to the wide range of possibilities here, including 
maternal privation—being deprived of maternal 
care from birth—and maternal deprivation—being 
separated from the biological mother after some 
period of maternal care (Ainsworth, 1962; Gan-
delman, 1992). In addition to maternal deprivation, 
children eligible for adoption, especially those with 
backgrounds of institutional care, may have expe-
rienced environmental deprivation (Gandelman, 
1992; Gunnar, 2001). Some of these children, rai-
sed in the worst institutional settings imaginable, 
may have experienced not only maternal and envi-
ronmental deprivation, but nutritional deprivation 
as well, leading to an early childhood experienced 
that could be characterized as global deprivation 
(Gunnar, 2001; Rutter et al, 1998). Furthermore, 
children adopted from foster care or institutional 
care settings may have experienced maltreatment, 
either at the hands of peers, family members, or by 
others assigned to their care (Johnson, 2000). Based 
on the presence of these risk factors, either singly 
or in combination, children adopted from foster 
care or institutional care would appear to be at se-
rious risk for a variety of delays and disturbances 
of development. 
A growing body of research has documented 
a wide range of developmental problems associa-
ted with environmental, maternal, and nutritional 
privation. Recently there have been several good 
reviews of the international adoption literature, 
which is a particularly rich source of information 
about the impact of early deprivation (Gunnar, 
2001; Gunnar, Bruce & Grotevant, 2001; Johnson, 
2000). Reviews of the existing evidence suggest 
that the consequences of early severe deprivation 
can be divided into two broad categories. The fi rst 
category includes defi cits that are very general 
in their nature, and show a striking tendency for 
“catching up” once children are placed in adoptive 
homes. Defi cits in this category include physical 
growth, general intellectual performance, and lan-
guage (Gunnar, 2001; Johnson, 2000; Mason & 
Narad, 2002; Rutter & the ERA Study Team, 1998). 
These fi ndings suggest that there is a fairly wide 
window of opportunity for these general characte-
ristics to develop. 
However, there is another category of defi cits 
that do not remit so easily after severely deprived 
children are placed in adoptive homes. These defi -
cits are less global, and appear to be specifi c conse-
quences of maternal deprivation (Ainsworth, 1962; 
Gunnar, 2001; Kraemer, 1992). If true, this is an 
important fact, for it means that adopted children 
with a wide range of backgrounds are susceptible 
to these socio-emotional defi cits, because mater-
nal deprivation, broadly defi ned as it is here, is by 
far the most common characteristic in the back-
grounds of adopted children. The socio-emotional 
defi cits commonly seen in adopted children ma-
nifest themselves in a variety of ways, including 
externalizing behavior problems (e.g., aggres-
sion), poor emotion regulation (especially with 
anger), poor inhibitory control, weak social cog-
nition, and disordered attachments (Gunnar, 2001; 
Johnson, 2000). In the discussion that follows, we 
will divide these into three subcategories: attach-
ment disorders, regulatory disorders, and behavior 
problems. Although these categories are often dis-
cussed as if they were independent aspects of the 
child’s functioning, there is a growing understan-
ding of the rich connections among them, based 
both on common developmental histories and un-
derlying neuropsychological processes (Kraemer, 
1992; Schore, 1994; Siegel, 1999).
Research on the connection between maternal 
deprivation and later attachment disturbances has 
a venerable tradition stretching back to the pio-
neering work of Bowlby (1951; 1969/1982, 1973, 
1980) and Harlow (1958, 1971), among others. 
Research with postinstitutionalized children has 
documented that maternally deprived children 
are at risk for a range of attachment disturbances, 
ranging from the relatively mild to the severe (Fe-
derici, 1998; Gunnar, 2001; Zeanah, in press). As 
might be expected, postinstitutionalized (PI) chil-
dren are at higher risk for insecure attachments, 
although this risk appears to be moderated by age 
at adoption (Chisholm, Carter, Ames, & Morison, 
1995; Juffer & Rosenboom, 1997; Marcovitch 
et al., 1997). More troublesome is that children 
with backgrounds of maternal deprivation are at 
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very high risk for disorders of attachment, espe-
cially disorders of nonattachment (Zeanah & Bo-
ris, 2000; Zeanah, Boris, Bakshi, & Lieberman, 
2000), a fi nding that has been observed by at least 
three different research groups (Chisholm, 1998; 
O’Connor, Bredenkamp & Rutter, 1994; Tizard 
& Rees, 1975). An important addendum to these 
fi ndings is a substantial debate about nosologies 
for attachment disorders, with Zeanah and his 
colleagues (Zeanah, 1996; Lieberman & Zeanah, 
1995; Zeanah & Boris, 2000) making a convincing 
case for developmentally-based alternatives to 
the “offi cial” classifi cation schemes found in the 
Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disor-
ders (1994) and the International classifi cation of 
diseases (1992).
Children who suffer maternal deprivation will 
very often experience limited sensory input and 
have limited opportunities for transactional ex-
periences with their social and physical environ-
ments (Gunnar, 2001; Johnson, 2000). Although 
not as well researched as are the attachment dis-
turbances associated with maternal deprivation, 
sensory defi cits have been documented in at least 
a few studies (Cermak & Danhauer, 1997; Cermak 
& Groza, 1998; Haradon, Bascom, Dragomir, & 
Scripcaru, 1994; see also Johnson, 2000). These 
sensory defi cits are often conceptualized as sen-
sory integration defi cits, i.e. disturbances in the 
child’s ability to process, integrate, and modula-
te sensory input (Ayers, 1979; Fisher & Murray, 
1991; Kranowitz, 1998). In terms of clinical no-
sologies, sensory integration problems have been 
included in the Zero to Three (1994) classifi cation 
of regulatory disorders (Barton & Robins, 2000). 
Originally proposed by Greenspan and colleagues 
(Greenspan, 1992; Greenspan & Weider, 1993), 
regulatory disorders include both sensory and 
emotional components, and indicate fundamen-
tal disturbances in the child’s ability to organize 
activity and responsivity to environmental input 
(Barton & Robins, 2000; Stieben et al, 2007). There 
is a growing consensus among developmentalists 
that the ability to self-regulate in this way emer-
ges from the matrix of caregiver-child interactions 
early in life (Hofer, 1994; Schore, 1994), so it is no 
surprise that maternally deprived children would 
exhibit defi ciencies in this regard. In fact, neurop-
sychological research with post-institutionalized 
children has shown that key structures (OTHA in 
Figure 1, above) associated with self-regulation 
and processing of socio-emotional information are 
functionally depressed (Chugani, Behen, Muzik, 
Juhasz, Nagy, & Chugani, 2001). Further evidence 
for regulatory abnormalities comes from studies 
that have documented chronic abnormalities in 
neuroendocrinological functioning among samples 
of children with institutional backgrounds (Carl-
son & Earls, 1997; Gunnar, Morison, Chisholm, 
& Schuder, 2001). 
As might be expected, given that foster-care and 
institutional-care children are at risk for disturban-
ces in such foundational developmental arenas as 
attachment and self-regulation, these children are 
also at risk for behavior problems and poor peer re-
lationships (Gunnar, 2001). Several research teams 
investigating the adjustment of children adopted 
from institutions have documented behavior pro-
blems that may arise after adoption (Fisher, Ames, 
Chisholm, & Savoie, 1997; Gunnar et al, 2007; 
Juffer & van Ijzendoorn, 2005; Rutter et al, 1998; 
Verhulst, Althaus, & Versluis-Den Bieman, 1990a, 
1990b, 1992). These fi ndings are congruent with 
studies of institutionalized children, such as those 
conducted by Tizard and her colleagues (Hodges & 
Tizard, 1989a, 1989b; Tizard & Hodges, 1978; Ti-
zard & Rees, 1974). In general, what these studies 
show is that many maternally deprived children 
experience problems of an externalizing nature 
(i.e., control of anger and inappropriate aggres-
sion), and have diffi culty forming friendships with 
peers. There are at least three avenues by which 
these problems may develop. First, institutiona-
lly- or foster-reared children may have been denied 
the opportunity to develop those self-regulatory 
processes associated with sensitive and respon-
sive maternal care (Hofer, 1994; Schore, 1994), 
and which are now believed to be preventative of 
problematic childhood behaviors (Calkins & Fox, 
2002; Dishion, French, & Patterson, 1995; Quay, 
1993). Second, these children may have been de-
nied the opportunity develop prosocial behaviors 
that ordinarily develop by virtue of normative 
socialization in the home environment (Grusec, 
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Davidov, & Lundell, 2002; Eisenberg & Valiente, 
2002). And third, maternally deprived children may 
have had the opportunity to learn behaviors that are 
considered antisocial (and hence maladaptive) by 
their adoptive families and by society at large, but 
that were adaptive in the ecologies where they lived 
and learned prior to being adopted. Johnson (2000) 
has, for example, described the maltreatment expe-
rienced by at least some institutionalized children, 
and whether the child was the victim or the instiga-
tor, these situations are opportunities for acquiring 
behaviors appropriate for that context.
Parental care: The cradle of humanity
The parallels between the profi les of psychologi-
cally abandoned children, as seen in the sequences 
displayed in Figures 1 and 3, and the profi les of 
adopted children with institutional backgrounds 
are striking. Of particular importance is the fact 
that the same neural structures (OTHA) show up 
repeatedly in studies of both normal and abnormal 
socio-emotional development (Chugani, et al., 
2001; Schore, 1994). The associated behaviors are 
seen not only in the sequences leading up to severe 
antisocial behavior, but also in the studies of post-
institutionalized children. The convergence of these 
fi ndings strongly suggests that early experience, 
maternal deprivation in particular, is a causative 
factor in the formation of the antisocial persona-
lity. Keeping Figure 3 in mind, we can conclude, 
with some degree of certainty, that although not all 
maternally deprived (or psychological abandoned) 
individuals will become antisocial, virtually anyo-
ne who in fact becomes antisocial will have been 
maternally deprived. In this sense, then, we can 
conclude that maternal deprivation may actually 
be the root of all evil. But the converse is also true, 
maternal (or more generally, parental) care is the 
foundation for our humanity, that which makes us 
essentially human. For isn’t it true that the mons-
ters in our midst, those who are depraved, show us 
what is most important to being human by what 
they lack?
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